International Investigations: What the Law Permits, and What It Does Not

An international investigation often feels like a space without borders, where information moves freely for anyone who knows where to look. The reality is the opposite. The more borders an enquiry crosses, the more distinct legal regimes it meets, and the smaller the room for improvisation.

Most cross-border failures are not failures of detection. They are failures of planning, discovered once the deadline is fixed and the fieldwork has already begun.

Three questions shape any multi-country mandate: where the facts occurred, where the work will be carried out, and where the report will be used. Those answers determine the applicable framework far more than the nationality of the client or of the firm.

The principle of territoriality

Private investigation is exercised within the framework of the state where it is conducted. A Geneva firm may run documentary research from Geneva on facts that occurred abroad, but fieldwork, interviews and observation fall under local law. This point is frequently overlooked when a mandate is placed.

Regimes differ sharply. Some countries require a national licence, others a regional authorisation, others prohibit private investigation outright. In several jurisdictions, access to certain databases — detailed commercial registers, vehicle records, address files — is reserved for holders of a local authorisation.

Using local correspondents requires a written mandate, precise instructions and an explicit list of what may and may not be done. A correspondent left without a framework produces either inaction or initiatives nobody can stand behind.

Choosing a correspondent is not a matter of price alone. It is a matter of being able to document a step, name sources and state what could not be obtained. Responsibility stays with the instructing party: their name is on the report, and they will have to explain how the information was gathered.

A serious correspondent documents every step: date, place, interlocutor, nature of the check and its result. Without that trail, the final report rests on assertions nobody can reconstruct six months later, when a question arises before a judge or a supervisory body.

Data and cross-border transfers

Collecting and transferring personal information between countries is regulated. Swiss data protection law, supplemented by the GDPR where it applies, requires a legal basis, a defined purpose, data minimisation and a framework for transfers outside the territory concerned. An informal exchange of files between two providers is not a neutral act.

The practical consequence is simple: a report may not circulate as freely as one imagines. Sending a note containing personal data to a wider circle than originally intended creates a risk separate from that of the investigation itself. That question belongs to the scoping stage, not to the delivery.

It is therefore worth fixing at the outset who receives what, in which format and for how long. A distribution list drawn too widely, or too late, undoes much of the discretion achieved upstream.

Evidence and its use

Information lawfully obtained is not automatically admissible before a court. Admissibility depends on the procedure, the forum and the way the material was created. That is why preservation matters as much as collection: original, timestamp, chain of custody, absence of alteration.

Where the material is held by a third party or a foreign authority, obtaining it generally runs through judicial channels, including international mutual legal assistance. No private firm can substitute itself for a formal request to a foreign court, and suggesting otherwise is an immediate warning sign.

Judicial channels are slower, but they produce material that withstands examination. A private report can prepare that step, sharpen it and make it more precise; it never replaces it.

What is not possible

It is worth stating plainly, because the request arrives regularly in softened form: « can you obtain… ». The answer is no for a range of items, whatever the country, the budget or the urgency.

• Accessing bank accounts or statements held by a bank
• Intercepting telephone or electronic communications
• Entering private premises or intruding into IT systems
• Consulting police files or non-public investigation records
• Obtaining data through identity deception or the purchase of illicit databases

A provider who promises any of these, or hints at « a contact », is putting the client at risk. The cost of a refusal stated early bears no comparison with that of an unusable report, or of proceedings opened against the party who ordered it.

Organising a multi-country enquiry

Scoping is done country by country. Each jurisdiction has its own registers, delays, languages and court holidays. A timetable that ignores those differences produces partial reports delivered after the decision they were meant to inform.

The final report must reflect that heterogeneity. A finding documented by an official register and a finding drawn from a local interview are not equally solid, and presenting them on the same level is a methodological error. Consolidation does not erase differences in reliability; it makes them readable.

A cross-border enquiry is prepared before it is launched. An initial confidential consultation identifies the countries involved, the local constraints and the realistic timeframe. It commits you to nothing. These pages are editorial information and do not constitute legal advice.